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Abstract: Prior research has examined how experienced fireground commanders make task related 
decisions under a range of unfavourable conditions, however gaps still exist in the literature when there is 
need to evaluate the coping strategies of incident commanders across different urban environments. There 
was rarely any study found to have explored cross-cultural differences that exist between two or more fire 
services with distinct cultural orientations. This paper reports findings from a study that compared 
firefighting approaches used by the UK and Nigerian firefighters. Thirty experienced officers were 
interviewed (UK=15, Nigeria =15) using the critical decision method, and retrospective incident reports 
were collected and analysed. As expected, results revealed that the UK fire service are significantly better 
equipped with advanced equipment compared to their Nigerian counterparts who often make 
improvisations using relatively unsafe methods. However, evidence was found to suggest that the Nigerian 
officers are culturally biased towards the use of certain firefighting equipment. The implications of these 
cultural differences for practice are discussed.     
Keywords: Firefighting, culture, decision making, training, critical decision method 
 
1. Introduction 
Fire is a complex object in itself that often times require a complex method of inquiry. In very 
threatening contexts such as the massive engulfment of an inhabited building, it can create a complex 
environment that makes response effort extremely difficult. Prior research (Burke and Hendry, 1997; 
Klein et al. 2010; Lipschitz et al., 2007) has shown that urban firefighters typically operate in an 
environment that is characterized by a number of task constraints such as uncertainty, ambiguity and 
missing data; dynamic and continually changing conditions; time pressure. However, despite these task 
constraints, civilians whose lives and properties are at stake often expect a lot from fire crews. In fact, 
members of the public often judge the effectiveness of any response effort in terms the extent to 
which response crews are able to salvage valuable properties (Tissington and Flin, 2005; Okoli et al., 
2014). Considering the crucial role that the fire and rescue service (FRS) play in any society, it therefore 
appears even more needful to prepare firefighters for the unexpected and to equip the organization 
with relevant, up-to-date equipment so that they are able to cope with the demands of the present 
day fire incidents.       
Prior research has examined different aspects of firefighting. Scholars have examined the decision 
making strategies used by expert urban fireground commanders in solving difficult fireground tasks 
(Burke and Hendry, 1997; Okoli et al., 2013); compared the cognitive architecture of expert and novice 
firefighters (Calderwood, Crandall and Baynes, 1990); assessed the mode of communicatio n either 
between incident commanders and fire crews at the operational level or between personnel at the 
control room and on-scene firefighters (Klein et al. 2010; McLennan et al., 2006); and examined how 
fireground commanders coped with and managed various types of uncertainties on the incident 
ground (Lipshitz et al., 2007). However, all of these studies have been conducted either within a 
particular geographical region or across different countries with similar cultural characteristics. Rarely 
was any study found that compared the firefighting strategies across two or more fire services with 
distinct cultural orientations. Following the dearth of knowledge in this area, this paper aims to report 
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a study that explored how expert firefighters (both in the UK and Nigeria) made difficult decisions 
while managing complex fireground tasks, with particular focus on the fire-fighting resources available 
to both services and how response efforts were shaped by these resources.  
2. The role of culture in understanding task performance within a community of practice 
Research on national culture and its impact on organizational performance is not new, but can be dated 
back to the work of Hofstede who examined the cultural differences of individuals across over forty 
countries between 1967 and 1978 (Hofstede, 1983). Hofstede’s main proposition was that the way people 
think is often conditioned by the core values underpinning their national culture, suggesting that the 
subject of culture can no longer be relegated to the rear when it comes to understanding how people 
behave within their community of practice. On this note, Hofstede (1983) defined culture as the collective 
programming of the mind that is taught to other members of the group as the right way of doing things. He 
provided some useful analogies regarding how difficult it is to change people’s existing cultural mind-set, 
unless one first detaches them from their culture.   
Culture within the context of this study is understood as the symbolic and learned social processes that 
generate and sustain shared norms and values between members of a social group. It represents not only 
national or ethnic cultures, but also the easily “taken for granted” procedures that have become part of an 
organization’s daily routines. As noted by Nonaka (1994), individuals often internalize the moral values of 
their organizations as they undergo socialization with other members within a community of practice (Lave 
and Wenger, 1991). Ample evidence exists to suggest that knowledge in itself, and therefore shared 
cognition within a group, cannot be separated from the context in which it was created (Maqsood, Finegan 
and Walker, 2004; Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009). This implies that both the creation and sharing of 
knowledge is often deeply embedded in temporal contexts, which include the environmental conditions, 
cultural overtones, and social circumstances that underpin people’s actions (or inaction). In knowledge 
creation theory the term “context” is often referred to as “ba” — a shared space where knowledge is 
created based on the interactions and relationships that exist in a group, often between actors, agents and 
structures. Ba, which is similar to the concept of “community of practice” (Lave and Wenger, 1991), can be 
physical, virtual, mental or any combination of these. An attempt to measure knowledge between two or 
more groups is therefore likely to pose some challenges, since knowledge in itself is strongly bound to 
culture. It can therefore be implied that different “bas” exist for both the UK and the Nigerian firefighters. 
The initial assumptions that drive this study are that the difference between the two groups would 
predominantly lie in the quality of firefighting technology and the response resources available to each 
group.  
3. Methodology 
This study explored “cognition in the wild”, for which scholars are particularly interested in studying what 
experts know and do in the real world, and how they use their experience to solve difficult domain tasks 
(Klein 2003; Okoli et al., 2016a). The phrase “naturalistic decision making” (NDM) is widely used to describe 
this body of research and mainly involves studies conducted in valid environments where tasks are “real” 
and “natural”.  
3.1 Knowledge elicitation tool  
In order to enhance the process of knowledge elicitation and contribute to existing knowledge on fire-
ground decision making, the current study employed a formal knowledge elicitation tool known as the 
critical decision method (CDM). The CDM method makes it possible to elicit in-depth information about the 
strategies used by experts to manage critical domain tasks. CDM uses a set of opening queries to stimulate 
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the recall of salient fire cases i.e. incident where firefighters made important decisions that stretched their 
knowledge and skills beyond the “comfort zones” (see Okoli et al. 2016b for details).  
3.2 Selection of Participants  
Thirty experienced fire-fighters who currently serve in relatively busy fire stations were recruited for the 
study across both study areas (UK=15, Nigeria=15). The participants were carefully selected on the basis of 
their rank/position and also through peer nomination; this was to ensure that expertise is verified and not 
assumed (see Table 1 and 2). Since the study aims to better understand how the two groups of experts 
coped with the task constraints associated with managing complex fire incidents, care was taken that all 
the participants had personally served as the overall incident commander in managing a real-life incident.  
3.3 Procedure 
Participants were first asked to recall and ‘walk-through’ a memorable fire incident that particularly 
challenged their expertise. They were informed in advance either through an email or a phone call about 
the nature of the interview, and were told the type of incidents that were of interest to the study i.e. non-
routine or atypical incidents, which would normally command the use of advanced firefighting equipment 
as opposed to routine incidents. After narrating the incident from start to finish, participants were asked to 
go over the incident again, but this time with the intention of constructing a timeline (i.e. making a 
summary of key decisions made from the start of the incident to when events were brought under control). 
During timeline construction, decision points were identified, which represented the point where 
participants admitted choosing a specific course of action even though other potential alternatives were 
available. Some examples of decision points from the study include: ‘I committed my crews into the 
building with breathing apparatus’, ‘I requested additional fire engines because I thought we didn’t have 
enough on ground’, ‘I divided the lines of hose into two streams’. The timeline construction and decision 
point identification phases were then followed by probing each decision point using a set of CDM cognitive 
probes (see Hoffman, Crandall, and Shadbolt, 1998 for details of the CDM procedure). Each interview lasted 
between 1hr-2.5hr and was tape recorded using an MP3 recorder. A total of 134 decision points were 
obtained from the thirty incidents. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using a 
combination of a qualitative coding process and the emergent themes analytical method developed by 
Wong (2004). 
4. Results 
In our wider study, a range of cultural differences emerged between the UK and Nigerian firefighters, 
including insights about the contextual factors that drive the development of these differences. This 
discussion was structured into four themes: cultural context of the firefighting equipment and resourcing, 
cultural context of the approaches to training and perceived training needs, cultural context of the 
firefighting tactics, and cultural differences in governmental and environmental influences. However, the 
current paper will only focus on the cultural differences relating to firefighting equipment and tactics 
between the two groups of firefighters.  
4.1 Cultural differences in firefighting equipment and resourcing 
Analysis of the incident reports in respect of the firefighting technology available to both groups of 
firefighters show that the UK group have access to sophisticated firefighting equipment that are completely 
beyond the reach of their Nigerian counterparts (Table 1). For instance, most of the incidents reported by 
the UK firefighters were managed using one or more sets of advanced firefighting appliances such as high 
volume pumps, computerized breathing apparatus and hydraulic platforms.  
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Table 1 ─ Analysis of firefighting resources used on the incident ground by the UK and Nigeria 
firefighters   
 
The Nigerian firefighters, like their UK counterparts, believe they have a duty of care to members of public 
to save lives and valuable properties. They strive to mitigate and prevent the escalation of fire incidents as 
much as they possibly can and with the resources available to them. But a major concern that was raised by 
all the Nigerian participants relates to the poor condition of the equipment available to them. They claimed 
that the fire crews are most times limited in their operational performance due to lack of modern 
infrastructure that is able to match the challenges of the 21st century fires. In a bid to avoid shying away 
Fireground practices                 Modes of operation 
       UK Nigeria 
Protecting officers from inhaling smokes, toxic 
and poisonous substances 
 The use of computerized 
breathing apparatus set 
 Use of handkerchiefs (face 
towels) 
Committing crews into a well alight building 
(offensive firefighting)  
 Breathing apparatus sets  
 Entry control board and 
identification tallies 
 Use of face masks  
 Spraying water on 
firefighters to cool the heat 
around them 
Protecting officers against excessive heat and 
physical injuries 
 Fully kitted PPEs (helmet, 
fire-boots, touch lights, fire-
jackets, and whistles).  
 Fire breaks (excessive release 
of water to unaffected areas)  
 Spraying water through the 
hose to reduce the amount 
of heat around the 
fireground 
Gaining access to high rise buildings   Hydraulic platforms  
 Fire helicopters  
 Dry riser systems 
 Use of ladders and hook 
ladders 
Ensuring constant supply of water  Fire engines are connected 
to hydrants  
 High volume pumps (HVPs) 
 The use of two or more fire 
engines to secure more 
water 
 Going back to stations to 
replenish fire trucks 
Communication between incident commanders 
and control department 
 Wireless radio 
communication 
 Mobile phones 
Managing crowd and creating hazard zones  Use of inner/outer cordons 
 Use of hazard tapes 
 Reliance on security 
agencies to help control 
crowd 
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from their responsibilities as firefighters, these officers resort to using improvised measures, some of which 
appeared highly risky when compared to their UK counterparts (see Table 1). For example, entering a well-
alight building burning of combustible substances without proper personal protective equipment, or 
fighting chemical fires without breathing apparatus sets seem to defy any reasonable logic of safety for the 
Nigerian firefighters, yet they frequently reported undertaking these acts as part of their response 
strategies.   
Also, the Nigerian firefighters often arrive at fire scenes relying solely on water carried in the fire trucks as 
hydrants do not currently work in the country unlike in the UK. They either do not exist at all, or unable to 
run where available due to poor water networks (see excerpts below). Hence within the Nigerian context 
where water availability is quite challenging, securing and managing water effectively during response 
operations appear to be one of the main goals pursued by incident commanders. In coping with this crucial 
challenge, the Nigerian officers often deploy more than one vehicle at a time to fire scenes. Once water in 
one fire engine is exhausted, it goes back to the nearest fire station for replenishing while another fire 
engine is engaged.  
The excerpts below illustrate the above points more clearly: 
“We come for replenishing, that is one of the problems around here. But if there are water 
hydrants around there, the best thing is just to couple our hose and other equipment into the 
hydrant and start to fight fire. What we do here for now is that if there is fire incident, there is 
more than one vehicle that will attend, and they noticed that the water is not enough, they 
will come back to the station to replenish the tank, and go back. That is the system we are 
using” (Adam, CFS, 30, Nigeria) 
 “No hydrants available, if water finishes we have to come back to the station and then fire 
cannot wait for you. The tanker can only take 15,000liters of water. Look at Ilorin we have only 
2 stations, if fire happens in like Oloje, do you think the house will not burn down before we 
get there? That is why when we get there we face problem, people will be stoning us. They will 
be fighting us” (Kevin, 8, Watch Commander, Nigeria).  
Figure 1 – A face mask used by the Nigerian firefighters in 
place of breathing apparatus sets 
              
Figure 2 – A rubber boot used by the Nigerian 
firefighters in place of safety boots 
 
4.2 Cultural bias towards the use of certain technology 
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Although a significant difference in the level of firefighting equipment and resource capabilities between 
both countries exist (see Table 3, Fig 1 & Fig 2), an interesting finding emerged from the analysis of the 
transcripts that seemed to provide further explanation to the differences that exist between the two 
groups of firefighters. A cultural bias against the use of breathing apparatus was identified amongst some 
of the Nigerian firefighters, which was traceable to the information they received in their training school. 
One of the officers reported that although they were told the importance of using breathing apparatus sets 
when fighting massive fires, they were also advised on the need to constantly breathe in “natural” air. In 
other words, these officers believe that since breathing apparatus sets do not supply natural oxygen then 
constantly relying on “artificial” oxygen from the appliance will eventually prove detrimental to their health 
in the long run. 
“Sometimes you may not have BA; you have one handkerchief [face towel] to cover your 
nose…..You see in any fire we are always advised to use BA; but what we learnt is that to use 
BA, you will not feel comfortably or enjoy free air like this” (Sammy, 8, FSO, Nigeria) 
In contrast, in none of the UK incidents did any of the officers enter a well-alight building without their 
breathing apparatus sets. One of the UK officers when asked about their entry procedure into a well-alight 
building reported thus:  
“It was very much a rule that we have a person and another person with an electronic board 
and they monitor the firefighters that are deployed to the building, it’s a very safe system and 
we wouldn’t deviate from that at this fire because there was no need to” (Jade, Crew 
commander, 15, UK) 
5. Discussion and implications for practice 
The current study compared the firefighting strategies of the UK and Nigerian firefighters and particularly 
examined how technology affects task performance between the two groups. A number of scholars have 
accused the Nigerian fire service of being highly disorganized, judging from their work ethics and the way 
they generally respond to fire calls (Esinwoke 2011; Dare, Oke and Olanrewaju, 2009). For example, in a 
study that examined the economic implications of fire incidents in Lagos state (the largest commercial city 
in Nigeria), Cobin (2013) noted that serious gaps exist in the operational procedures and approaches to 
firefighting across some major cities in Nigeria. It has also been reported that most of the cities in the 
country often lose properties worth millions of dollars (and sometimes human lives) to serious fire 
outbreaks due to negligence on the part of the fire service (Dare, Oke and Olanrewaju, 2009). The saddest 
part of the story relates to the helplessness surrounding these Nigerian firefighters when managing major 
fire incidents. But as revealed in the current study, and in fairness to the firefighters, the moribund state of 
the fire service in the country is perhaps mainly due to the gross neglect of the institution by the Nigerian 
government. The lackadaisical attitude of the firemen, including their late arrival to fire scenes is best 
attributed to the weak infrastructural and technological development in the fire service. Although these 
conditions did not necessarily affect the overall performance of the Nigerian firefighters from the point of 
view of the incidents they reported in the study, the participants emphasized the massive holes that exist in 
the fire service ─ which they claimed is currently under-resourced. The drive in the firefighters and their 
awareness of the need to improve response efforts is probably an indicator of their willingness to learn 
when equipped with better equipment. Their counterpart, the UK firefighters, are much better equipped 
with advanced firefighting appliances that effectively enhanced task performance. This ranged from well-
equipped personal protective equipment (PPE) to modern fire engines with automatic coupled hose to 
specialist appliances such as foam tender and aerial fire helicopters. Nonetheless, this study acknowledged 
the potential difficulty in comparing the effectiveness of task performance between the two groups of 
firefighters. The two groups of experts approached their firefighting duties uniquely as they differed in their 
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organizational, environmental and operational setup. Cultural theorists have explained the importance of 
context in explaining people’s culture (way of doing things) and how meaning could easily be lost by 
attempting to understand internalized behaviour outside of the environment where such behaviour was 
developed (Hofstede, 1983; Schein, 2004). Gigerenzer used the term ecological rationality to demonstrate 
that rationality and behaviour are not only bounded, but also ecological (Gigerenzer, 2008). The term 
ecological suggests that performance is context-based and driven by the features of a particular 
environment. At best, one can be tempted to say that the UK firefighters managed the complex fire 
incidents extremely well with the support of high firefighting technology coupled with the advanced 
firefighting training they have acquired, while their Nigerian counterparts can be said to have coped 
extremely well with the task constraints despite being under-resourced.  
Findings from the study also suggest that more need to be done in addition to providing better firefighting 
appliances for the Nigerian firefighters ─ their cultural orientations must also be redressed.  Culture is one 
element that shapes people’s beliefs, values, attitudes and work ethics according to Hofstede (1983), and 
this statement was found to be true with both groups of firefighters. For example, even though the 
Nigerian firefighters acknowledged that breathing apparatus sets are designed to supply oxygen to 
operators while performing tasks under stringent conditions (excessive heat, smoke-log, combustible 
flames), most of the officers often fail to “trust” this equipment and rather prefer inhaling natural air by 
using water from the hosereels to support breath. This notion was thought to them as the best way to 
improvise in the absence of breathing apparatus sets, but however seems to exceed the limits of safety 
from all indications.   
Perhaps one of the main cultural differences between the two groups lies with the way the use of certain 
technology and procedures on the fire ground have been instilled on officers as an acceptable way of doing 
things. The UK firefighters tend to see the use of breathing apparatus sets or PPEs as a moral as well as a 
legal requirement in the work domain, whereas such rigid complaint measures seem to be lacking in the 
Nigerian fire service 
6. Conclusion 
The notable differences that were found to exist between the two groups related mainly to non-cognitive 
factors such as (equipment and training), although it is important to note that the experts across both 
groups made fireground decisions that were appropriate to their respective task environments (context-
based decisions) using the resources available to them. The Nigerian firefighters also provided evidence 
that suggests the need for reinforcement in the aspect of modern and up-to-date firefighting facilities. 
Would the Nigerian fire service become more effective if it were to be provided with better equipment? 
Would they be better-off if provided with more advanced training? Would the UK firefighters be able to 
cope if placed under the same conditions as their Nigerian counterparts? What cultural differences exist 
from the cognitive aspects of fire-fighting between the UK and the Nigerian fire service? What can the two 
groups learn from each other, if anything? These questions require further investigation and research is 
ongoing in these areas.  
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